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ASSIGNMENTS-SALE OF EXPECTANCY-VALIDITY.-HUDSON V. HUDSON, 78
N. E. 917 (ILL)-Held, that an estate in expectancy may be the subject o1 a
contract of sale which will be sustained when the transaction was fair and
supported by a valuable and adequate consideration.
While a mere expectancy could not be released or assigned at common
law. Hart v. Gregg, 32 Ohio St., 502, nevertheless such an assignment is up-
held by equity. Parsons v. Ely, 45 Ill. 232, provides it is without fraud and
is supported by a valuable consideration. In re Garcelon, 1o4 Cal. 570.
Kenney v. Tucker, 8 Mass. 143. Love and affection does not support the
transaction in the case of an insolvent debtor. Read v. Mosby., 87 Tenn.
759, and a mere possibility or expectancy, not coupled with any interest in or
growing out of property, can not be the subject of a valid assignment.
Jeffres v. Lampson, io Ohio St. 1o. Nor can the right of re-entry for a
breach of a condition subsequent before the branch. Ohio Iron Co. v.
Auburn Iron Co., 64 Minn. 404, for that right is confined to the grantor and
his heirs and can not be transferred by alienation. Trask v. Wheeler, 89
Mass., iog. Some early decisions, now overruled, decided that an expectancy
could not be assigned without the ancestors' written consent. Boynton v.
Hubbard, 7 Mass. 112, but the want of consent of an insane ancestor will not
defeat the sale, Hale v. Hallon, 35 S. W. 843.
BILLS AND NoTxs-DAFT ON FicTiTious PAYEL-SABOARD NAT. BANK
V. BANK OF AMERICA, too N. Y., Supp. 74o.-Held, that where a. draft is
drawn to the order of an existing firm, which did not know of its issuance, it
was not drawn to the order of a fictitious payee under the Negotiable Instru-
ments Law, Laws 1897, p. 724, c. 612, par. 28, subd. 3, unless the drawer bad
no actual knowledge of the existence of such firm and his intent was to make
it payable to bearer.
The general rule that a negotiable instrument, made payable to
a fictious person or order is in effect, an instrument payable to bearer,
applies only where it is so made with the knowledge of the party making it.
Armstrong, v. Bank, 46 Ohio St. 512; Bennett v. Farnell, I Camp. 130.
The knowledge must be merely that the note is payable to the order of a
fictitious person or of the maker. Irving Nat. Bank v. Alley, 79 N. Y. 536.
In many jurisdictions, however, there are contrary dicta. Where a party
executes a note to the order of a fictitious firm and thereafter the holder in-
dorses the note in the firm's name, a bona fida indorsee may recover against
the maker, even if the latter was ignorant of the fact that the firm name was
fictitious. Ort v. Fowler, 3 r Kans. 478; Lane v. Krekle, 22 Iowa 399. The
same rule applies against the first prior indorser in case of a fictitious iLdorsee.
Forbes & King v. ESfiy, 21 Ohio St. 474. The principle of liability where it
is existent, rests, in all cases, on the kround of estoppel. Norton on Bills
and Notes, p. 62, this principle having a very extcnded application, in order
to further the credit and circulation of negotiable securities. Story on Notes.
Sect. 8o; Frazier v. Massy, 14 Ind. 382.
BILLS AND NOTES-SEALED INSTJLUIMNTs-RxIcTAL.-JACKSON V. AUGUSTA
S. R. Co., 54 S. B., 697 (G.).-Held, that in order to render a promissory
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note a sealed instrument, it must be so recited in the body of the note. The
mere addition of a seal after a signature is insufficient.
At one time a promissory note in printed form with the printed letters
"L. S." contained in brackets after the maker's signature, as the only evi-
dence that it bad been sealed, was held to be a sealed instrument. Giles v.
Mauldin, 7 Rich. Law ix (S. C.). Proof of the signature of the maker of a
note, is of itself presumptive evidence of a sealed instrument, Merritt v.
Cornell, x E. D. Smith 335. Also it was held that a promissory note is pro-
perly sealed even though no scrolled seal be attached near the maker's name
if it concludes with the words, 'Witness my hand and seal." McCarley v.
Tifiak County Suf'rs, 58 Miss. 483. But now the tendency of the courts is
to construe a promissory note as a sealed instrument only when both the body
of the note is indicative of a sealed instrument and a scrolled seal is attached
near the maker's signature. Willhelm vi. Partone, 72 Ga. 898; Carter vi.
Penn, 4 Ala. L40.
CARRIERS-NoN-PAYMENT OF FARE-RIGHTS AND DuTIzs OF PASSENGEMS.-
NORTON V. CONSOLIDATED Ry. Co., 63 AWL. (CONN.), 1087.-Held, that a
passenger who has been ejected from a trolley car for refusing to pay a cash
fare, having presented a defective transfer, negligently issued, by carrier's
agent, can merely recover nominal damages for such expulsion, but has a
remedy for breach of contract.
The decisions on this subject seem to be in perfect accord. Hibbard v.
New York and E. R. Co., I5 N. Y. 455, laid down the doctrine "that the
plaintiff who had a ticket not good for the trip he was making, and who de-
clined to pay fare, cannot maintain an action for ejection from the train, but
must look to the breach of contract." In a case where a passenger has a de-
fective ticket, he should either pay his fare, or quietly leave the train and re-
sort to his appropriate remedy for any damage sustained. Peabody '. Oregon
R. &- Nav. Co., 21 Ore. 12r; Houston &5- Texas Cent. R. R. Co. v. Ford, 53
Tex. 364. In Chicago B. & 9. R. Co. v. Griffin, 68 Ill. 499, it was decided
that if a passenger is given a wrong ticket, it is his duty to pay a second fare
and that his proper remedy is on an implied contruct between him and the
company.
CONSTITrTIoNAL LAw-RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL-JURY OF SIx PERSONS.-
BETTGE v. TERRITORY, 87 PAC. 897 (OKL.). Held, that a statute providing that
a person charged with a misdemeanor may be tried in the probate court by a
jury composed of six persons is in conflict with the Federal Constitution and
is therefore void.
The federal courts and the courts of the territories construe the right to a
trial by jury in criminal cases, guaranteed by the Federal Constitution, as
meaning the right to have a jury of twelve persons the first time and in what-
ever court a person is put on trial. Cooley's Constitutional Law, 321. The
rules adopted by the state courts, however, in construing the same provision
in the constitutions of the several states are not so definite. By the weightof
authority trial by a jury of less than twelve persons, even by consent, is
mistr'al. Cdncemi v. Peoile, z8 N. Y. 128; Harris v. Peojfle, 128 Ill. 585.
But some jurisdictions hold that, in case of legislative enactment to that effect,
trial by jury may be validly waived, especially as to misdemeanors. State
'v. Worden. 46 Conn. 349; State v. Albee, 61 N. H. 423. And in most states
it is held that the right to trial by jury was not intended to apply to the pro-
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secution of minor or trivial offences. People v. justices, 74 N. Y. 4o6; Byers
v. Commonwealth, 42 Pa. St. 89. Other courts make the distinction that it is
valid to have a criminal trial without jury in the first instance when the de-
fendant is given an unfettered right of appeal and trial by jury in the appel-
late court. Jones v. Robbins, 8 Gray (Mass.) 329; Emporia v. Volmer, 12
Kan. 622.
CORPORATIONS-STOCK-CONSTRUCTION OF BY-LAw.-GELLERMAN v. ATLAS
FOUNDRY AND MACH. Co., et at 87 Pac. (WAsHi.) zc5.-leld, that when,
under a by-law of a corporation providing that the trustees may at their
discretion declare dividends, a dividend is declared on the paid-up stock, a
like dividend upon unpaid subscriptions for stock accrues and must be paid.
Root, Crow & Hadley. JJ. dissenting.
This seems to be a new question in the American courts, though in accord
with the English rule, (ook on Stockholders and Corfioration Law § 540;
Oakbank Oil Co. v'. Crum L. R., 8 App. 65. Its principle does not appear to
be fully established in the United States, Thompson v. Erie Ry. Co. 42 How.
Pr. 68 (N. Y ); Bailey v. Hannibal etc. Ry. Co., 2 Fed. Cas. No. 736.
Equity will prevent any discrimination in the distribution of dividends among
strekholders of the same class. Cratty v. Peorie Law Library Assn., 76 N.
E. (111.) 707. The class is determined by a pledge of profits in favor of certain
shar-s in preference to others. Taft v. Hartford etc. Ay. Co. 8 R. I. 310.
Against the main case it is held that the discretion of the trustees is controll-
ing, Jackson v. Newark Plankroad CO., 3z N. J. T. 277; Williams v.
Western U. Tel. Co., 93 N. Y. 162, with which, in the absence of fraud the
courts will not interfere. Bryan v. Sturgis Nat. Bank, go S. W. (Tex.) 704.
The By-law is a part of the contract. Hazelon-v. Belfast, etc. R. Co., 79
Me. 410; under which no dividends "accrue" until they are declared by the
trustees. Parks v. Automatic Bank Punch Co., 14 Daly (N. Y.) 424.
CRIMINAL LAwM-EVIDENCE-EvIDENCE OF OTHER OFFENSES.-ToPou.iV-
SKI v. STATE, IO9 N. W. 1037 fWis.)-Held, on a prosecution for theft, the
state claiming that the accused had conspired with another to steal property,
it was error to admit evidence that the accused had. prior to the occurence in
question, conspired with another person to steal pr.secutor's property. In any
transaction, evidence of a similar act is relevent only for the purpose of show
ing the intent. U. S. v. Fleming, 18 Fed. Reporter 907. Evidence of
similar frauds on the part of the defendant is admissible for purpose of show-
ing the animus. People v. Hughes, 36 N. Y. Supp. 493. In criminal prosecu-
tion, evidence should be confined to the offence charged, except where another
act is so connected with it that its commission directly tends to prove some
element of the alleged offense. Paulson v. State, xi8 Wis. 89. Testimony as
to a former offense in the same house, and with which the defendant was
connected, is irrelevant, unless it shows animus. Lightfoot v. Peafile, z6
Mich. 507. And it is not competent for the prosecution to place before the
jury facts tending to show another distinct offence, so as thereby to raise a
presumption that the party is guilty of the offense charged. Lightfoot v.
Peofile, x6 Mich. 5o7.
CRIMINAL LAW-FAILURE OF DEFENDANT TO TESTIFY-COMMENT THEREON
REVERSIBLE ERROR.-PRKINS v. TERRITORY, 87 PAC. 297 (OKL.). Held, where
the defendant is on trial, charged with the commission of a crime and fails to
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testify in his own behalf, and the prosecution comments upon such failure
to the jury, such comments constitute reversible error.
Prosecution has no right whatever to refer to the defendant, as to why he
did not clear up the affair. Peofile v. Doyle, 12 N. Y. 836. No language
shall be used by the prosecution to give to the jury the impression that since
the defendant did not testify, his guilt is established. Wilson v. U. S., x49
U. S. 6o. And the state cannot refer indirectly to the fact that the defendant
did not take the stand, for it may cause in the minds of the jurors a presump-
tion of guilt. State v. MoXley, 102 MO. 374. Austin v. State, 1o2 Ill. 261.
Dawson v. State, 24 S. W., 414.
CRIMINAL LAw-LIMITING ARGUMENT OF COUNSEL-DISCRTION OF COURT.
PEOPLE V. FERNANDEZ, 87 PAC. 1112 (CAL.). Held, that an order of the court,
limiting the time of the argument of counsel to one and three-fourth hours to
each side, was an abuse of discretion, requiring a reversal, on it appearing
that the counsel for defendant objected thereto, and showed that he could not
complete his argument within the time limited.
The constitutional provision guarantying to an accused the right to be
heard by himself or counsel, does not deprive the court of the discretionary
power to limit the argument of defendant's counsel, to a certain length of
time. Peagler v. State, Izo Ala. ii. The limitation is within the discretion
of the trial court. People v. Kelly, 94 N. Y. 526. With this discretion the
appellate court will not interfere unless it clearly appears from the record that
the rights of the prisoner were prejudiced. State v. Shores, 31 W. Va. 491.
What shall be an unreasonable limit depends upon the circumstances of the
case, its complexity or simplicity, the amount and character of the testimony,
the number of witnesses and time consumed in hearing the case. 12 Cyc. 569.
The rule does not apply to arguments on motions and questions arising
during the trial. State v. Jones, 117 N. C. 768. The courts of Montana, con-
trary to the general rule hold that in fixing in advance, the exact time needed
cannot be correctly determined, and if the court so fixes there is error. State
v. Tighe, 27 Mont. 327.
CRIMINAL LAW-PLEA IN BAR-EXISTENCE OF COURT-STATE V. HALL,
55 S. E. 8o6 (N. C.).-Held, an alleged plea to the jurisdiction of the court in
a criminal case, alleging that the court was not lawfully constituted because
the governor was out of the state at the time he directed the holding of the
term, and signed the judge's commission, was a nullity, since the court could
not pass on its own existence as a court.
Jurisdiction is the power to hear and determine a cause, the authority by
which judicial officers take cognizance of and decide causes, U. S. v. Arre-
dondo, 31 U. S. 691. The institution of a suit in a court that has no jurisdic-
tion is null. Mfora v. Kuzae. 21 La. Ann. 754. The proper course is to dis-
miss the action and not direct a verdict for the defendant, as that would be an
exercise of jurisdiction and not a disclaimer thereof. Clark v. Car. 45 Ill.
App. 469. The doctrine of a de facto officer does not apply even though one
is in possession of an office and exercising its functions with silent public
acquiescence, though wrongfully in possession, is an officer defacto and his
acts binding, Ellis v. Deaf and Dumb Asylum, 68 N. C. 423; for there can-
not be a de facto officer without a de jure office. Willard v. Pike,
59 Vt. 202.
DEATH-ACTION GROUNDS AND MEASURE OF DAMAGE.-WILMONT V. MCPAD-
DEN, 65 ATL. 157 (CoNN.).-In an action for the death of a child, Held, that
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plaintiff, if entitled to recover at all, may recover on the same grounds dam-
ages measured by the same rule as if the action had been brought by decedent
in his lifetime.
Where a parent sues for damages resulting from the death of a minor
child, evidence of the value of the child's services until it attained its majority,
is admissible, though the recovery is not necessarily limited to the value of
such services. Pierce v. Conners, 20 CoL 178. Where damages are claimed
for the death of a child incapable of earning anything, or rendering service
of any value, the value of its probable future service to the parent during its
minority is a matter of conjecture, and may be determined by the jury with-
out the testimony of witnesses. Little Rock Ry. Co. v. Barker and Wife,
39 Ark. 49'. Evidence that the father required the services of his little child
in order to maintain his household, was competent upon the question of dam-
ages. In this case the father recovered'damages for death of seven-year old
daughter. Pressman v. Mooney, 5 App. Hun., 12r (N. Y.).
D1VORcz-DZFZNSE-IUPL1ZD CONNIVANCL-DELANEY V. DELANEY, 65 ALT.
217 (N. J.).-The plaintiff introduced his friend to the defendant and in the
friend's presence charged her with adultery; subsequently by his acts and
omissions, the plaintiff exposed his wife to the temptation of adultery with
said friend and then alleging adultery to have occurred brought suit for divorce.
Held, For a single act of adultery by a wife, a divorce will not be granted to
a husband, who either connived at such act, or, in legal contemplation, con-
sented to it. Gummere C. J., and Pitney, Swayze, Reed, Vroom and Green,
J.J.. dissenting.
The absence of due precaution may amount to criminal negligence on the
part of the husband where the wife previous to marriage was seduced by her
husband, and after marriage warnings in regard to the wife's conduct, calcu-
lated.to excite his vigilance were given and no steps taken by him in conse-
quence. Dillon v-. Dillon, 3 Curt. Eccl. 86. A wife may plead the fact of
cohabitation when single, with the husband, in order to show a want of proper
vigilance on his part over her subsequent moral conduct. Graves v. Graves,
3 Curt. EccI. 235. Where husband and wife by mutual consent separated
after marriage the husband was deemed guilty of willful neglect conducing to
his wife's adultery. Hawkins v. Hawkins, 54 L. J. P. and Adm. 94. A hus-
band who seduces his wife before marriage, and after marriage sees her in a
situation of temptation and does nothing to rescue her, and she yields, will be
understood as having consented to her adultery. Cane v. Cane, 39 N. J. Eq.
14o. If a husband knows of his wife's weakness, he is called upon to exercise
peculiar vigilance and if he sees what a reasonable man could not see without
alarm, and makes no effort to avert the danger, he must be supposed to see
and mean the result. Hedden v. Hedden, 21 N. J. Eq. 6z.
DIVORC-DEsERTIOx.-FOOTE V. FOOTE, 65 ATL.-205 (N. J.). Where a
husband separated from his wife with her consent which was later withdrawn,
and he made no proffers to resume marital relations. Held, to constitute de-
sertion it is not necessary that the intent should have been formed at the
time the party left home, but it is sufficient if he afterwards determines to
desert, and persists in such determination-Pitney, Swayge, and Green, JJ.,
dissenting.
Separation and intention to abandon must concur in order to constitute a
ground for divorce. But they need not be synchronous. Pinkard v. Pink-
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ard, 14 Tex. 356; Reed v. Reed, Wright 224 (Ohio). Desertion will begin at
the time when a renewal of marital cohabitation is sought by the complain-
ant. Hankinson v. Hankinson, 33 N. J. 66. But there are circumstances
in which the law will justify a refusal to return. Porritt v. Porritt, is Mich.
420. The guilty intent is manifested when, without cause or consent, either
party separates from the other, Ingersoll v. Ingersoll, 49 Pa. 249; and this.
has been held notwithstanding the husband contributed to his wife's support,
Magrath v. Magrath, io3 Mass. 577. The conduct of the defendant may,
justify a finding of willful, continued, and obstinate desertion. Carroll v.
Carroll, 68 N. J. Eq. 727.
EVIDENCE-JUDIIAL NOTICE- SCIENTIFIC FACTS.-MACOMER V. STATE
BOARD Op HEALTH, 65 ATL. 263 (R. I.).-In an action to revoke a certificate to
practice medicine evidence was introduced that the practitioner had advertised
to produce certain results and cure of diseases with alleged electrical devices.
Held, That the court could not take judicial notice that such claims were false
but was bound to form its judgment on matters solely in evidence. Blodgett,
J. dissenting.
The court is bound to take judicial notice of all matters of art and science
which because of their public notoriety have been rendered axiomatic, Bryan
v. Beckley, 12 Am. Dec. 216 (Ky.); even though the court may bt actually
uninformed regardifig them. Brown v. Pifier, 91 U. S. 37. But this power is
exercised with great care and caution and every reasonable doubt resolved
promptly in the negative. St. Louis Gas Co. v. Am. Fire Ins. Co.. 33 Mo.
App. 348.
EVIDENCE-PARoL EVIDENCE EXPLAINING WRITINGS.-LAbBERT HOISTING
ENGINE CO. V. CARMODY, 65 ATL. r41 (CT.).-Held, that on an issue as to
whether a written contract was one for the sale of certain machinery or a lease
thereof it was proper to admit evidence of negotiations leading up to the con-
tract, for the purpose of determining the intent and purpose of the parties.
Parol evidence of the practical interpretation which the parties have by
their conduct given to a written instrument is admissible in determining the
intent and pi pose of the contract. St. Louis Gas Light Co. v. City of St.
Louis, 46 Mo. 121; Emery v. Webster, 42 Me. 204. And the statements and
conduct leading up to the contract, Rhodes v'. Cleveland Rolling-Mill Co.,
17 Fed. 426, as well as subsequent to it, Potter v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 63 Fed.
382, and, in fact, where the direct evidence is contradictory as to the exact
terms of the instrument, evidence of any circumstance bearing upon the point
in controversy may be introduced to show the understanding of the terms by
the parties. Houghton v. Clough, et al., 30 Vt. 312. But the understanding
which one party had, if not communicated to the other party, is not admissible,
Taft v. Dickinson, 88 Mass. 553. The language mutually chosen to express
the intention of their minds can be merely explained by parol evidence-
"The question is not what did the parties mean to say, but what is the mean-
ing of what they have said." Bartholomew '. ifuzzy, 61 Conn., 387.
HIGHWAYS-PERSON CROSSING FROM STREET CAR. TO CURB-CONTRIBUTORY
NEGLIGEiCE-GARSIDE v. N. Y. TRANSP. Co.. 146 FED. 588 (N. Y.).-Plaintiff
alighted from a street car, and after taking two or three steps was struck and
injured by the defendant's automobile. Held, that the plaintiff was not
bound as a matter of law to look in both directions along the street before
starting to cross to the curb, but the question, whether the failure to so look,
constitutes contributory negligence is one of fact for the jury.
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Some of the Western and Southern states agree that a greater degree of
diligence must be exercised by the driver of vehicles at a street crossing than
is required of pedestrians. Carter v. Chambers, 79 Ala. 223; Sykes v. Law-
lor. 49 Cal 236. The general rule in this country and in England is, however,
that their rights and obligations are correlative and each owes the other a
duty to avoid accident. Reens v. Mail &- Exfress Put. Co., 3o N. Y. Supp.
913; Baker v. Fear, 97 Pa. 7o. And if such pedestrian crosses a city street
where moving vehicles are numerous without looking in both directions along
the street and is injured, he may be guilty of contributory negligence. Barker
v. Savage, 45 N. Y. x91; Belton v. Baxter, 54 N. Y. 245. But if the plain-
tiff by the use of ordinary care, under the circumstances might have avoided
the cot'sequences of the defendant's negligences, and did not, the case is one
of mutual fault and no recovery is allowed. Cooley on Torts, 2d Ed. p. 8z2
and cases cited; Murfihy vz. Deane, ioi Mass. 455. Yet, if the defendant
discovered the negligence of the plaintiff in time, and by the use of ordinary
care could have prevented the injury and did not do so, an action will lie
against him. Thomri. on Neg. Vol. II., i57. To have this rule apply, how-
ever, the negligence of the one must be subsequent to that of the other.
Bigelow on Torts, 31r; Beach on Cont. Neg., 59. In all such cases this ques-
tion of contributory negligence is generally one of fact for the jury. Orr v.
Garabold, 85 Ga. 373; Peltier v. Bradley Darn v. Carrington Co.. 67
Conn. 42.
INDICTMENT AND ImFoRmATIoN-CoNvicTIoN OF LESSER OFFENCE-STATU-
TORY PROVISIONS-STATE V. MATTHEWS, 55 S. E. 342 (N. C.)-Held, that under
an indictment for murder in the first degree, the jury may find accused guilty
of murder in the second degree.
Under an indictment for murder in the first degree, the accused may be
convicted of any degree of murder, or manslaughter, for the unlawful killing
of the identical person charged by the identical means charged in the indict-
ment. Keefe v. The Peofile, 40 N. Y. 384. One indicted in the usual form
for murder may be convicted of manslaughter, because, if the averment that
the killing was with malice aforethought be negatived or stricken from the
indictment, there remains a sufficient charge of manslaughter. Giskie v.
The State, 71 Wis. 612. Wherever a person is charged upon information with
the commission of an offence under one section of the statutes, and the offence
charged includes another offence under another section of the statutes, the
defendant may be found guilty of either offence. State v. Burwell, 34
Kan. 312.
INSURANCE-SUICIDE BY THE INSURED-VALIDITY OF PRovxsxoN-Tn.Ax-
TON V. METROPOLITAN INSURANCE CO., 55 S. E. 419. Held, A provision in an
insurance policy that if the insured, within one year from its issue, die by his
own hand, whether sane or insane, the company shall be liable only for the
premium paid, is valid. Walker, J., dissenting.
Where one person kills himself when his reasoning faculties were so im-
paired that he was unable to understand the consequence and effect of his act,
or was impelled thereto by an irresistable insane impulse, the beneficiaries
under the policy could maintain an action and the clause in the policy is void.
Mutual Lfe Insurance Co. v. Walden, 26 S. W. 1o, 12; Insurance Com-
fiany v. Akens, SO U. S. 468. When one intentionally drowned himself
with the knowledge of the consequence of the deed, the beneficiary could main-
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tain an action irrespective of the clause in the policy. Boileau v. Insurance
Company, W'kly Notes Cas. 145. When a person so unfortunate as to have
his power of reasoning impaired and not to understand the moral character,
the general nature, consequence and effects of the act he is about to commit,
which he cannot resist, such death is not within the contemplation of the
parties to the contract and the insurer is liable. Life Insurance Co. v.
Terry, i5 Wall 5o8.
INTEREST-CoMPUTATIoN-CoMPOUND INTEREST.-INHABITANTS OF TISBURY
v. VINEYARD HAVEN WATER Co., 79 N. E. 256 (MAss.). Held, that where in-
terest is to be allowed on money due, the computation is to be of simple in-
terest, unless there is an express requirement to the contrary.
The common law rule, not to allow compound interest, has been generally
followed in the United States, Wilson v. Davis, i Mont. 183; and compound
interest is recoverable only when statutes so provide. Denver Brick Mgg
Co. v. McAllister, 6 Colo. 261. But the law favors interest upon interest in
special cases of fiduciary relations. Wofford v. Wyly, 72 Ga. 863. As in
the case of decedent's solvent estate in payment of his debts. Ellicott v.
Ellicott 6 Gill & J. 35. Or where money is withheld by reason of neglect or
intentional misconduct of the debtor. Royner v. Bryson, 29 Md. 473. And
principal and interest may be aggregated to date of judgment and interest
upon the aggregate reckoned from that date. Stanton v. Woodcock, 19 Ind.
273. However in the case of judgment on appeal interest is calculated on the
principal of the original debt. Tindall v. Meeker, 2 Ill. 137. And compound
interest is not recoverable on a bill to redeem a mortgage which is to secure
an annual interest bearing note. Kittredge v. IcLaughlin, 38 Me. 513;
Hyde v. Brown, s La. 33.
LANDLORD AND TENANT - INJURY FROM DEFECT - CONTRIBUTORY
NEGLIGXNCE OF TENANT.-RzAMS V. TAYLOR (87 PAC. 1089) (UTAH.), Held,
though a landlord break a covenant to cover a cellarway. he is not liable for
injuries to a tenant who falls therein, where, knowing the nature of the defect,
the tenant fails to exercise her right to repair the defect and deduct the ex-
pense from the rent, or to surrender the premises, and exposes herself to the
risk of injury.
The cases in point seem to sustain this decision and one court goes so far
as to state that when the plaintiff was fully aware of the facts the plaintiff's
fault was as much responsible for the injuries as the defendant's. Town v.
Armstrong, 75 Mich. 580; Quinn v. Perham, 151 Mass. 162. The question of
contributory negligence forms the basis of these cases and it has been held
that in order to support an action for negligent injury the plaintiff must prove
himself free from contributory negligence. Mahon v. Burns, 34 N. Y. Supp.
91. It is even said that from the moment of transfer neither party is bound
to improve on the premises and that if a landlord should enter for any such
purpose the tenant might forcibly eject him. Weir v. Simfison, 2 Phila.
i58. In one jurisdiction it was held that the landlord only had to make the
premises fit for hiring purposes and that the tenant knowing of defects and not
repairing them was guilty of contributory negligence if he sustains injuries by
reason of said defects. Daley v. Quick, 99 Cal. 179.
MASTER AND SERVANT-MACHINERY INsPEcTIoN-DELEGATION OF DUTY.
-CLARK V. GOLDIE-IO9 N. W. 1044 (MICH.). Held, that the duty of a
master to inspect machinery to determine its safety cannot be delegated but
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his duty to inspect for the purpose of keeping the machinery in good order
may be delegated and the employer absolved from responsibility to servants
for an improper performance thereof.
Master's responsibility is determined by the character of particular act or
omission to which the injury is attributable. McElligott v. Randolph, 6x Conn.
x57. Duty of the master to inspect as to safety of machinery, etc., is a dixect,
personal and absolute obligation, Lewis v. Seifert, z6Pa. 628; and if he dele-
gates this duty to an agent and the agent fails in its performance, the master
is responsible, Ingebregtsen v. Word Duetscher Lloyd Steamshi Co., 57 N.
J. L. 4oo. This duty of the master goes beyond inspection of safety of
machinery and extends to a reasonable, careful and skillful inspection in order
to keep it in a proper and safe condition for work, Ohio &- M. Ry. Co. v.
Pearcy, 27 N. E. (IND.) 479; and maintaining suitable instrumentalities for the
performance of the work required, Ford v. Fitchburg R. Co., izo Mass. 24o.
MASTER AND SERVANT - INJURIES - EXEMPTIONS FROM LIABILITY.-
ATCHiSON, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. FRONK, 87 PAC. REP. (KAN.) 698.-
Held, that under the Kansas .statute a contract entered into by an
employee exempting master from all liability for damages sustained in con-
sequence of the negligence of the master, his agents, servants or employees,
is against public policy and void. Burch, J., dissenting.
This decision is in harmony with other decisions of the state, Railroad
Co. v. Pearby, 29 Kan. 16q. The early trend of American decisions leaned
the other way, Mitchell v. Railroad Co., I Am. Law Reg. 717 (Pa.); Farwell
v. Railroad Co., 4 Met. 49 (Mass.). All the states are now practically unani-
mous in declaring such a contract void as against public policy. Railroad
Co. v. Orr, 91 Ala. 548; Roesner v. Hermann, 8 Fed. 782 (C. C.). Such an
instrument is void for want of consideration, Purdy v. R. R. Co.; 125 N. Y.
209. Such liability is not createdfor the protection of the employees simply
but has its reason and foundation in a public necessity and policy, which
should not be asked to yield or surrender to mere private.interest or agree-
ments, R. R. Co., v. S6angler, 44 Ohio State 471. In Georgia however, such
contract is valid, if it does noc waive any criminal neglect of the company or
principal officers, R. R. Co. v. Story, 52 Georgia 46!.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-PEANUT ROASTERS ON SIDEWALK-EXPLOSION.-
FRANK v. ViLLAGz OF WARSAW, 10 N. Y. Sup. 938. Held, that the mainten-
ance by the owner of a store of a peanut roaster between the sidewalk and
the street cannot be held as matter of law a public nuisance so as to make the
village liable from injury to a pedestrian from the explosion thereof. Sprine
and Williams, JJ. dissenting.
A legal nuisance has been defined as any unauthorised obstruction of the
free use of the street, Simon v. Atlanta, 67 Ga. 618; while a public nuisance
is any obstruction or encroachment upon the public street, Columbus v'.
Jacques, 30 Ga. 5o6, State v. Carpenter, 68 Wis. z65. That of the main case
seems to be a mixed nuisance, as public in nature but productive of injury to
a private individual. Acme Fertilizer Co. v. State. 72 N. E. (Ind.) 1037; such
obstruction is a nuisance per se, Robinson v. Mills, 65 P. (Mont.) 14, Webb
v. Demopolis, 95 Ala. I6, Davis v. New York, 14 N. Y. 5o6, for any injury
for which the city is liable, New Haven v. Sargent, 38 Conn. 5o, Centerville
v. Woods. 57 Ind. 162, Ft. Worth v. Crawford, 74 Tex. 404. It is immaterial
that the obstruction is not a fixture. Cohen v. New York, 113 N. Y. 532.
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NEGLIGENGEX-PLACES ATTRACTIVE TO CHILDREN-GRAVES V. WASHINGTON
WATER POWiR CO., 87 PAC. o56 (WASH.). Held, that the fact that a public
bridge was attractive to boys did not render an electric company liable for
injuries to a boy received while climbing up a pier, and caused by touching one
of the company's live wires.
This case brings up the exceptions which it has been attempted to ingraft
upon the general rule that a landowner is under no duty to a mere trespasser
to keep his premises safe, Chicago K. &- W. R. Co., 53 Kan. 279; Goy v.
Essex Electric St. R. Co., 159 Mass. 238; and upon the further principle that
the fact that the trespasser is a child does not raise a duty where none other-
wise exists, Ritz v. Wheeling, 45 W. Va. 262; Frost vt. Eastern R. R., 64 N.
H. 22o. This rule has been modified in some jurisdictions by decisions which
declare that a property owner is liable when he has upon his premises machin-
ery at once dangerous and attractive to children in places where they are
likely to go. Sioux City S. P. R. Co. ii. Stout, 17 Wall. 657; Keefe v,. Mil-
waukee &- St. P. R. Co., 21 Minn. 207. But the doctrine of these so-called
I ITurntable Cases" has been sharply criticised and the tendency at present is
to apply it with extreme strictness; Twist v. Winona &- St. P- R. Co., 39
Minn. x64; Overholt v. Viet As, 93 MO. 422. Some courts have even gone so
far as to repudiate this doctrine entirely and hold that the youth of a trespasser
is not to be taken into consideration. Daniels v. N. Y. 6- N. E. R. Co., 154
Mass. 349; Walsh v. Railroad Co., 145 N. Y. 301.
NuiSANC-INJUNCTION-CONFLICT OF EVIDENCE.-SEIIGMAN V. VICTOR
TALKING MACH. Co. 63 ATL. 1093 (N. J,). Held, an injunction should issue
restraining the operation during the night of a manufacturing plant, which is
proved to have prevented the plaintiff and his family from sleeping because of
noises and vibrations produced by the machinery, even though residents in the
same vicinity were not so affected.
The decisions on this question, as to when an injunction will be granted
are not entirely in harmony. An injunction will issue to restrain the operation
of steam machinery which jars and shakes the complainant's house so as to
render it unsafe or unfit for habitation. Dittman v. Refifi, 5o Md. 5x6. It is
sufficient if the nuisance render life uncomfortable. Howard v. Lee, 3 Sandf.
281; Catlin et. at. v. Valentine, 9 Paige 575. Some courts hold that if the
evidence be conflicting, and the injury be doubtful, that will constitute a
ground for witholding the injunction. Newark Aqueduct Board vt. City of
Passaic, I8 AUt. io6; VcCaffreys Afifieal, 1o5 Penn. 253; Dumesnil v.
Dupont, 57 Ky. 800. In line with the case under consideration, it was held in
Filson v. Crawford et. al., 5 N. Y. Supp. 882, that the injury sustained
because of the stamping of horses in defendant's stable was an actionable
nuisance, though several witnesses testified that they heard little or no noise
coming from the stable. Rogers v. Elliott, 146 Mass. 349 holds that the
probable effect of the sound upon ordinary persons, and not upon a particular
person, is the criterion upon which the granting of an injunction is to be
determined.
PARDON-CONDITIONAL RELEASE-RE-ARREST-STATE V. HORNE, 42 So. 388
(FLA.).-Held, where a prisoner has accepted a conditional pardon and has
been released from imprisonment by virtue thereof, but has violated or failed
to perform the conditions subsequent, such pardon becomes absolutely void
and the criminal may be re-arrested and compelled to undergo the remainder
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of his original sentence even though the time of his original sentence has
elapsed.
The pardoning power of the president in this country as specified in Act.
II., Section 2 of the Federal Constitution is not subject to any legislative con-
trol. U. S. v. Wilson, 7 Pet. (U. S.) xSo; Ex fiarte Wells, IS How. (U. S.)
307. So also the governor, in all the states, either solely or with others, has
the power to conditionally pardon persons convicted of crimes, other than
impeachment and treason, by virtue of his state constitution. People v. Pet-
ter, 3 Park (N. Y.) 47. This pardoning power, however, is not necessarily an
executive function, but resides where the Const. places it, and in the absence
of legislation, it vests no more power in the executive than in the legislative
or judicial department. State v. Nichols, 26 Ark. 74. One who claims the
benefit of a pardon must be held to strict compliance with its conditions.
Haym v. U. S., 7 Cir. Ct. 443; Warney v. U. S., 7 i. Sor. Hence it is a
general rule in England and in this country that the pardon, in the case of a
condition precedent. does not take effect and in the case of a condition subse-
quent becomes void, and the criminal may be re-arrested and compelled to
finish his original sentence, though the time of such sentence has elapsed.
Com. v. Halsfield, 2 Pa. L. J. 37; Cole.'s Case foo X. B.. 466. But if the
condition annexed thereto is illegal or impossible the condition is void and the
pardon becomes absolute. Lee z'. Murfiy, 12 Am. Rep. 563. In the absence
of statute or express provision in the pardon the person charged with violating
the conditions of his pardon has the constitutional right to be examined and
tried like any other person charged with crime. Peofile v. Mloore., 62 Mich.
497. But the accused is not entitled to a jury trial, as a matter of right,
except upon the question, whether he is the same person who was convicted.
Exfzarte Alvarez, 39 So. 481; State v. WVolfer, 53 Minn. 135. However, it
has been held that the violation of a condition in a pardon is a question of fact
and may be properly determined by the verdict of a jury. Peojfle v. Burns,
143 N. Y. 665.
PARENT AND CHILD-SUPPORT OF CHILD-LIABILITY OF PARENT. -SMITH V.
GILBERT, 98 S. W. iUs (ARK.). )reld, a parent is not liable for necessaries
furnished his child unless he has refused to furnish them, and one employing
a child in spite of the objections of the parent who has not refused to furnish
the child with necessaries cannot, on being sued for the value of the services
of the child deduct what he has paid the child, and which the child used in
buying necessaries,
In Keaton v. Davis, I8 Ga. 457 it was held that a father, in the absence
of a reasonable and proper exigency, was not liable to a third party, who had
supplied his son with medicine and medical attendance. Thus a father is not
liable to a third party for necessaries furnished his infant son without his
authority to do so. Brown v. Deloach, 28 Ga. 486. But where the infant is
under the authority of the parent, there must be a clear and palpable omission
of duty. in that respect on the part of the parent, in order to authorize any
other person to act for and charge the expense to the parent, Van Valkin-
burgh v. Watson, 7 Am. Dec. 395; X3 Johns 48o. And no promise of the
parent can be implied, where the infant leaves his parent's house in dis-
obedience of her commands, and went to live with the plaintiff, under a con-
tract that he should remain with the plaintiff until he should become of age.
Raymond v. Loyl, io Barber 483. Therefore one who trades with an infant,
and gives credit to him alone, knowing all the facts of the case, cannot sus-
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tain an action against the father for necessaries thus delivered. Gordon v.
Potter, 17 Vt. 348.
PzLADINr--BiLL--MULTFARIOUSNZSS-PRICKTT V. PzicsaTr, 42 So. 408
(ALAt).-Held, that a bill seeking to enforce a resulting trust in land, and on
independent averments to have alimony decreed to the complainant, was
demurrable for multifariousness.
Multifariousness is the improper joining in one bill of two independent
and disconnected matters and thereby confounding them. Storys Eq. P1.,
9th Ed. Section 271; Daniell's Chancery Pr., 5th Ed. 334. There are two
kinds of multifariousness, one as to the subject matter and the other as to par-
ties. Weston v. Blake, 61 Me. 452. Gartland v. Minn.. xi Ark. 720. The-
former is identical with the common law misjoinder. Brown v. Bullsner,
86 Va. 612; Green v. Richards, 23 N. J. Eq. 32. That is, in equity, mis-
joinder is a species of multifariousness. Durling v. Hammar, 20 N. J. Eq.
220. Under the code practice, however, the terms are used indiscriminately,
but owing to the use of the term in these two senses it is more desirable to use
the word multifariousness. Behlow v. Fisher, 102 Col. 2o9: Emery v. Ers-
kine, 66 Barb. (N. Y.) 9. There is no inflexible rule as to what constitutes
multifariousness in a bilL Barney v. Lathan, 103 U.S. 215; Oliver v. Pratt,
44 U. S. 333. It must be determined largely from the circumstances of the
particular case, and even then depends much on the discretion of the judge.
Wash. City S. Banks v. Thornton, 83 Va. x66; Stevens v. Bosch, 54 N. J.
Eq. 59. So the uniting of a purely legal demand with an equitable demand in
a bill has been held not demurrable for multifariousness. Johnston v. Little,
37 So. 592; Wellsburg &- S. L. R. Co., v. Panhandle T. Co., 48, S. E. 746.
In some jurisdictions the test is whether the causes of action united in the bill
require separate proofs and decrees. Walker v. Powers, 104 U. S. 245;
Holton v. Wallace, 66 Fed. 409. Another test, more frequently employed,
is whether the bill, fairly construed, shows a single object and seeks to enforce
one general and common right. Wells v. Bridgeport, 30 Ct. 316; Wood v.
Sidney Sash, etc. Co., 92 Hun. (N. Y.) 22. A complete and satisfactory test
would probably require a combination of both of these tests. U. S. v. Guy-
lard, 79 Fed. 23; Africa v. Knoxville, 70 Fed. 739. Objection to multifari-
ousness should always be taken by demurrer. Pelham v. Edelmeyer, I5
Fed. 262; Bessell v. Beckwith, 33 Ct. 357. In determining this question,
however, the court cannot look to the answer or proof, but to the bill only.
Halstead v. Shefiard, 23 Ala. 558; Eastman v. Savings Bank, 58 N. H. 4a2.
PUBLIC FnNDs-DEPosIT OF SAME IN BANI-LIABILITY FOR Loss.-STATz
TO UsE OF FxNTRzss COUNTY v. RZED ZT AL, 95 S. W. 8o9 (TENN.). Held, a
county trustee depositing public funds in a bank, is not relieved from liability
for loss resulting from the insolvency of the bank, by showing that he acted
in good faith in selecting the bank.
In a few jurisdictions the rule of responsibility of bailees for hire has been
applied to county treasurers, exonerating them from liability for the failure of
bank in good standing at the time moneys were placed on deposit, Cumber-
land Co. v. Pennel, 69 Me. 357. But the weight of authority is to the effect
that where the statute in general terms imposes a duty to turn over public
moneys and there is no condition limiting that obligation, the obligation will
be deemed absolute, zi Cyc 447. Public policy requires that every depositary
of the public money should be held to a strict accountability, and the trustee
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is liable even though the funds were stolen without fault on his part. U. S.
t. Prescott, 3 How. 578. The state in prescribing the condition of the treas-
urer's liability has determined the nature and extent of the obligation assumed
by him, Ross School Fund Com. v'. Hatch, 5 Clark (Ia.) 199; and so there
being no statute in South Carolina which imposes upon a county treasurer a
higher obligation than that imposed by the common law, such officer is not
liable for the loss of funds occasioned by the failure of the bank in good stand-
ing at the time moneys were deposited. York County v. Watson, Is S. C. I.
He is not liable when loss results from act of God or the public enemy. U. S.
v. Thomas, is Wall. 333.
RAILROADS-CRosSING ACciDENT-WILFULNESS.-PITTSBURGH C., C. & ST.
L. Ry. Co. v. FERRELL, 78 N. E. (IND.) 988.-Plaintiff was struck and injured
at a railroad crossing by defendant's passenger train going from fifty to sixty
miles per hour. The crossing was used by from one hundred to one hundred
and twenty-five teams daily. The whistle was sounded and the bell was
rung in warning for a quarter-mile. The engineer did not see the plaintiff until
the collision coming and the fireman not until the plaintiff was just about to
drive on the track. The plaintiff's horse had approached at a brisk trot. Held,
that such facts were insufficient to establish a wilful injury on the part of the
railway company. Robinson and Roby, JJ., dissenting.
A complainant, in an action to recover damages for wilful or wanton in-
jury by a railroad, must allege wilfulness or wantonness in causing the injury
and not merely in the propelling of the train by the defendant. Haley v.
Kansas City, M. &. B. R. Co., 113 Ala. 640. If the party injured is himself
guilty of wanton and reckless conduct, he may not recover, even although the
defendant's employees were also reckless or wanton in such a way as to imply
a willingness to inflict the injury. Georgia Pac. Ry. Co. v. Lee, 92 -Ala. 262.
But a railroad company, which without precaution or warning sends cars
across a public crossing under no control is liable for wanton and reckless
negligence. Lake S/tore &- M. S. Ry. Co. v. Johnson, 35 Ill. App. 430.
Where one recklessly and without regard to the consequences, inflicts an in-
jury which he might.have avoided, such conduct will imply wilfulness. Pitts-
burgh, C., C. &- S. Ry. Co. v. Judd, xo Ind. App. 213.
RAILROADS-INJURIES TO PEDESTRIANS ON TRACK-CoNTRIBUTORY NEGLI-
GENCE.-CRANCH v. BROOKLYN HEIGHTS R. Co., 78 N. E. 1078 (N. Y.). A
pedestrian, intending to take passage on a train at a station was struck by a
train which did not stop there. She saw the train approaching but walked
ahead and stepped on the track without again looking for the train. Held,
that she was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. Vann and
Bartlett, JJ., dissenting.
In general, in determining whether a person has been guilty of contributory
negligence, it is held to be the duty of every person lawfully attempting to
cross a railway, to stop, look, and listen for approaching trains. Lehigh
Valley R. Co. v. Hall, 61 Pa. St. 361; Dowdy v. Ga. R. Co., 88 Ga. 726. A
passenger, however, has a right to rely upon a railway company to ensure the
safety of its stations. Therefore, a passenger may cross tracks at stations
without stopping to look and listen. Chicago R. Co. v. Ryan, 165 IlL 88; B.
&- 0. R. Co. v. State, 60 Md. 499. And a person going to the depot of a
railway company to take passage on its trains, although not having purchased
a ticket, is regarded as a passenger. Grimes v. Penn. Co., 36 Fed. 72; Texas
& P. R. Co. '. Best, 66 Tex. ix6. But when such a passenger is injured in
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trying to cross a railroad track in front of an approaching train which he actually
saw, the rule appears to be different. Chicago Railway Co. v. Chancellor,
165 Ill. 438, holds that in such case, unless a person stops to look and listen
immediately before stepping on the track, he is guilty of contributory
negligence.
SALEs-BREACH OF WARRANTY-REMEDIES OF BUYE.-WHITE V. MILLER,
109 N. W. (IowA) 465.-Plaintiff purchased a cow with a calf I' by her side,"
the sale being under a warranty to the effect that a cow with calf should be
regarded as one animal, that the cow was a breeder and that, if the cow failed
to fulfill the warranty, the "animal" might be returned and the price would
be refunded. The cow not fulfilling the warranty, the plaintiff tendered her
to the seller and then sued. Held, that the contract had fixed a remedy in
case of breach of warranty and the plaintiff, not having tendered the calf could
not recover. McClain & Ladd, JJ., dissenting.
When the parties have not stipulated as -to the course to be taken on
breach of warranty, the vendee has his election either to sue on the warranty
or to rescind the contract by returning the property and suing for the purchase
price. McCormick & Bro. v. Dunville. 36 Iowa 645. It is competent, how-
ever, for the parties to provide by conract that on failure of warranty, a par-
ticular course shall be pursued. King v. Towsley, 64 Iowa 75. If it is agreed
that the thing purchased shall be returned before liability accrues, the pur-
chaser, before he can recover damages must show a return, an offer to return,
or a waiver by the vendor of such requirement. David v. Gosser, 41 Kan.
414. There are, however, minority dicta to the effect that, where a thing is
sold under a warranty providing that the purchaser may return it, if the war-
ranty fails after a specified time, the right of return is optional with the vendee
and a right of action exists for a breach of warranty. Moore v. Emerson. 63
Mo. App. 137; Saar, Scott &- Co. v. Patterson, 65 Minn. 449.
SALES-CONTRACT FOR SALE AND DELIVERY OF COAL-WHAT CONSTITUTES
EXCUSE FOR FAILURE TO MAKE DELIVERIES.-SAMUEL H. COTTRELL & SON V.
SMOKELESS FUEL CO., 129 FED. 174 (VA.). Held, that a contract for sale and
delivery of coal from a certain mine at specified prices which was subject to a
provision that deliveries should be subject to strikes, which might delay or
prevent shipment, would not excuse seller from performance, because of a
strike which merely increases cost of production and cost to the seller.
Nothing will excuse the performance of an express contract which is
neither unlawful nor impossible but the act of God, the law, or the other party
to a contract. Stees v. Leonard, 20 Minn. 494. Thus, where a duty is created
by a party's agreement, the party will not oe excused from performance,
though he is disabled without his own fault. Mill Dam Foundry v. Harvey,
38 Mass. 417 and in D. L and W. R. R. v. Bowns, 36 N. Y. Super. Ct. 126,
the seller was held liable for non-performance of a contract to furnish coal,
which contained a provision that seller should be exempt from performance in
case of a strike, it being shown that strike iesulted from reduction in wage by
seller, so Budgett v. Binnington I S. B. 35 holds that a dock strike affecting
the labor engaged both by the shipowner and the charterer does not relieve
the charterer from promise to have cargo unloaded at a specified time. A
duty or charge made upon a party by his own contract is enforceable against
him, notwithstanding any accident or necessity since he might have provided
against same in contract. Clark on Contracts, sec. 250.
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TAXATIoN-PoPERTY SUBJECT TO TAXATION-PERSONAL PROPERTY OUTSIDE
.OF STATE-PEOPLE EX EEL. A. G. HYDE & SONS V. O'DONNEL ET AL TAX COM'RS,
xoz N. Y. Sup. 6o.-Held that under Laws 1896 p. 795 C. go8, making per-
sonal property situated or owned within the state subject to taxation, property
-of a domestic corporation which was without the state, was not taxable,
though such property was generally brought into the state to be sold. Clarke
& Scott, J.J., dissenting.
The general rule is that the domicile of the owner determine the situs of
personal property for taxation purposes. Morgan County v. Walton
County, 121 Ga. 659; Herron v. Keeron, 59 Ind. 472; Sagamon & Mf. R. Co-
w. Morgan County, 14 Ill. x64. The legislature may change this rule at
-will. City of Winston v. Salem, 131 N. C. 404, City oJ Baltimore v. Safe
Dep4osit & Trust Co., 97 Md. 6s9. The place of taxation has been limited to
the permanent situs of tangible personalty. -Delaware L. &- W. R. Co. v.
Pennsylvania. x8 U. S. 341. People ex. rel. Hoyt v. Tax &- A. Comrs. 23
N. Y. 224. Against the main case, it is held that the mere absence of a resi-
dent's personalty from the state does not affect its situs. People v. Barker,
$3 N. Y. Sup. 33; to change which, a permanent location outside of the state
is necessary. People ex rel. P. -41. S. Co. v. Coras. of Taxes, 64 N. Y. 541.
TELEGRAPH-FAILURE To DELIVER A MESSAGE-PRESUMPTION OF NEGLIGENCE
-BURDEN. SHEPARD VS. WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH Co., 55 S. E. 7o4-Held,
Though negligence of a telegraph company will be presumed from a week's
delay in delivering a message, the presumption maybe rebutted, and it is not
necessary that the rebutting evidence preponderate, the burden being on the
plaintiff to show negligence.
Where there is an unquestionable delay in the transmission of a message,
the burden of explaining the delay is on the telegraph company, Julian v.
Western Union Telegrap6h Co., 98 Ind. 327; Telegra,6h Co. v. Griswold,
37 Ohio State 301. The telegraph company must exonerate itself by showing
how the delay occurred, and in absence of such proof, the jury will be
authorized to presume a want of ordinary care and negligence on the part of the
company. Rittenhouse v. The Independent Line of Telegrafih, 44 N. Y.
263; Tyler v. Western Union Telegraph Co., r4 A. R. 3A. When a telegram
is not delivered until more than three days have elapsed after its receipt, the
burden is on the company to explain the delay. Harkness v. Western Union
Telegraph Co., 73 Iowa xgo; Sweetland v. Telegrapih Co., 27 Iowa 433.
TELEGRAPHS AND TELEPHONES--NEGLIGENCE-ACTIoN-PETITION-SUFFI-
ClENCY-WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH Co. v. ROWE ET AL 98 S. W. 228 (TEx.).
Held, where in an action against a telegraph company for delay in transmit-
ting a message, the petition alleges facts sufficient to show a contract to sub-
mit and deliver a message, though it does not allege a contract was made.
It has been held that a person to whom a telegram is addressed may
maintain an action for the failure to forward and deliver promptly, on proof
that the sender acted as his agent and that the telegraph company knew of
the fact. Western Union Telegrapih v. Wilson, 93 Ala. 32; 30 Am. St.
Rep. 23. But if the complaint shows that the defendant, who was engaged by
the plaintiff undertook to transmit the message, the mutual obligation of the
parties is sufficient to maintain the action, although it was not alleged that
anything was paid for the message . Western Union Telegraph v. Meeck,
49 Ind. 53. Damages, which are recoverable are direct damages, resulting
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from a breach of contract, which the parties to the contract would have
contemplated as flowing from its breach, if at the time they were fully in-
formed of the facts. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Pells, 8 Ky. Law
Rep. 53I. Whether it is sufficient to maintain an action against a telegraph
company, which undertook to transmit a message, without alleging that delivery
was within office hours, see Western Union Telegraih Co. V.Jumfi. 2 Wilson
Civ. Cases, Ct. Appeals, Article 41. But a petition in an action against a
telegraph company for failure to deliver a message which alleges that the
message was given to defendant's agent by.telephone, and a contract made to
send it, and that it was the custom of defendant's employees, known to
defendant, to receive such messages by telephone is not bad for want of an
averment that the message was in writing, Texas Telegraph and Telepihone
Co. v. Seiders, 29 S. W. 258; 9 Tex. Civ. App. Article 431.
WITNESSEs-LADING QUESTIONS.-STATE V. WATERS, 109 N. W. 1013 (IA.).
Held, that. where on a prosecution for statutory rape. prosecutrix was reti-
cent in giving her testimony, leading questions were proper.
The general rule is that leading questions are not allowed in the direct
examination; U. S. V. Dickinson, 2 McLean 331; Greenleaf on Evidence,
§434; Wigmore on Evidence, 769; unless the witness is hostile. Bradshaw v.
Combs, 102 Ill. 428. And leading questions are allowed if the witness is
biased, Stratford v. Sanford, 9 Conn. 283, or is unwilling, State v. Benner,
64 Me. 279, or weak minded, Armstead v. State, 22 Tex. App. 59, or surprised
the examining attorney with his answers, St. Clair v. U. S., x54 U. S. ISo.
At the discretion of the trial judge a full disclosure of witness' knowledge may
be elicited. Towns v. Alvord, 2 Ala. 380. Brassell v. State, 91 Ala. 45, is
directly in harmony.
